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Due to differences in – inter alia – language, culture, and economic priorities, Belgium has been 
increasingly federalized through successive state reforms. What does it mean for the country as ‘the 
mother of all elections’, scheduled for 2014, draws closer? 
Federalism in Belgium 
The federalisation of Belgium formally started in 1970 and is still on-going. In 1993, Belgium’s unique 
federal system, consisting of a central state, three economic Regions (Wallonia, Flanders and 
Brussels-Capital Region) and three cultural Communities (French-speaking, Dutch/Flemish-speaking 
and German-speaking), was enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
The Flemish Community comprises the Flemish Region plus the Flemish-speaking inhabitants of the 
Brussels-Capital Region. The French Community consists of the French-speaking part of the Walloon 
Region plus the French-speaking inhabitants of the Brussels-Capital Region. The territory of the 
German-speaking Community lies within the Walloon Region. All entities have their own capital, 
government, parliament, administration, and symbols (flag, anthem, ‘national holiday’). The Flemish 
Region and the Flemish Community merged into one political structure. 
 
The Regions have powers in territory-related fields (e.g. environment, agriculture), the Communities 
have ‘language-based’ competencies (e.g. culture, education). The Federal level manages the public 
finances, the army, the judicial system, social security, foreign affairs, substantial parts of public 
health and home affairs, as well as everything that does not explicitly come under the Communities 
or Regions. 
 
The subnational entities not only have far-reaching internal political, legal and spending autonomy, 
but also foreign responsibilities in the fields for which they are domestically competent, including the 
right to conclude treaties on those matters. The Regions and Communities also play a direct role in 
day-to-day European decision-making. The Maastricht Treaty allowed regional ministers to be 
members of the Council instead of national ministers, provided that there is only one head of 
delegation who speaks for his/her state as a whole: any federal or regional minister should defend 
the Belgian point of view, and the Belgian votes cannot be divided. The representation of Belgium in 
the Council is regulated by Cooperation Agreements of 1994 and 2003 between the federal and 
subnational governments. Depending on the topic, a federal or regional minister represents Belgium, 
according to a rotation system. 
 
 Separatism in Flanders 
The two most visible and most media-covered rifts between the Northern and Southern part of 
Belgium are related to language and economy. The former is mainly apparent in and around Brussels, 
where Flemish- and French-speakers live on the same territory, giving rise to struggles about political 
representation and language use in public services. The latter fissure is country-wide: while in the 
19th century Wallonia was the economic engine of Belgium, Flanders has become the most 
prosperous region throughout the 20th century. Flanders has witnessed increasing separatism in the 
past decades. Political parties striving for Flemish independence present the financial transfers – via 
the national budget and social security – from North to South as an important argument for their 
case. 
 
Flemish nationalism was initially represented in politics by the Volksunie (People’s Union). Due to 
ideological differences within the party, it was split up into several new parties. Throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s, the Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc), explicitly advocating Flemish independence, 
gained increasing electoral support, even after the party was convicted for incitement to 
discrimination and racism and changed its name to Vlaams Belang (VB, or Flemish Interest). In the 
past years, however, its popularity has quickly declined to around 8% at present. In the latest 
national elections, in 2010, N-VA (New Flemish Alliance) – which defends less radical points of view 
than VB but still wishes to establish Flanders as an independent state after a gradual ‘evaporation’ of 
Belgium – became the largest political party in Flanders and even in Belgium. N-VA’s popularity rose 
until 2012, but throughout the year its support in Flanders stagnated at around 36%. 
However, the success of nationalist parties does not reflect an overwhelming preference for Flemish 
independence. In a 2011 poll, only 22% of the respondents supported an independent Flanders. In 
Wallonia, there are no significant political parties striving for Walloon independence. Yet, while 
Flemish politicians increasingly push for further federalisation or even an independent Flemish State, 
reflections on a ‘Plan B’ sporadically pop up on both sides of the language border. 
 
The campaign for the  2012 local elections shows how topical the issue of further Flemish autonomy 
is in Flanders. The elections were unusually characterized by discussions on national topics. N-VA 
explicitly communicated that voting for that party was a first step towards the next national election, 
planned in 2014. Its leader Bart De Wever, who became mayor of his hometown Antwerp, first called 
on the Belgian prime minister to start talks on a “confederation” and only later referred to local 
issues in his victory speech. 
The balance of power in Belgian politics 
The Flemish political parties signed an agreement in 1989 to create a cordon sanitaire against VB, 
meaning that they would not enter into government talks on any level with this party. After it 
changed its name, no new agreement was signed, but government talks with VB are still taboo. 
There is no such cordon against N-VA; the party is a member of the Flemish Government since 2009, 
together with social-democrats and Christian-democrats. 
 
N-VA took also part in the national government formation talks after the 2010 elections – which 
lasted for 541 days and were herewith the longest in world history – but could not find common 
ground on a number of issues. The current federal government is composed of social-democrats, 
Christian-democrats and liberals from both sides of the language border, and is implementing the 6th 
Belgian state reform, including a transfer of additional competences to the Regions and 
Communities, as well as a reform of the voting constituency system. While the government has a 
comfortable majority of 96 seats in 150-seat legislative chamber, it has no majority on the Flemish 
side; this point is often raised by Flemish nationalist parties when challenging the legitimacy of the 
government or the Belgian state. 
 
While the political right is rather popular in Flanders, Walloon voters have a clear preference for left-
wing parties. The governments of the French Community and Walloon Region are both composed of 
social-democrats, Christian-democrats and greens. 
The Brussels problem 
As far-reaching autonomy or independence of Belgium’s subnational entities are increasingly 
discussed by politicians and in the media, some practical concerns have been voiced, such as the 
position of Brussels. The Brussels-Capital Region is physically encapsulated in the Flemish Region, but 
the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants (approximately 85%) is French-speaking. The region 
generates around 19% of Belgium’s GDP, nearly all official institutions of the national and 
subnational entities are located in Brussels, and the Belgian capital hosts most EU institutions and a 
number of other international organisations such as the NATO. In the event of a split-up of Belgium, 
both Flemish and Walloon authorities would likely ‘claim’ Brussels. In 2011, the parliament of the 
French-speaking Community unanimously adopted a resolution stipulating that, from then on, it 
would use the name “Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles” in its communications, campaigns and in the 
administration. This move was met with strong criticism from the Flemish government; the Flemish 
and national authorities do not use this denomination, neither do the Flemish media and some 
French-speaking media. Although the establishment of this ‘Federation’ has no far-reaching practical 
or legal consequences, it reveals much about the problems the status of Brussels could produce if 
Belgium would be divided in two. 
Separatist parties and the EU 
There is a general pro-European consensus among most political parties in Belgium. This consensus, 
combined with a low salience of EU issues to the general public, results in a low politicization of 
European topics. Yet, the separatist parties in Flanders hold diverging positions towards the EU. 
While VB explicitly rejects the current organisation of the EU, N-VA is usually viewed as contributing 
to the Belgian permissive consensus. However, this party takes an ambiguous approach. On the one 
hand, it views the EU as the most suitable macro level: it supports the austerity policies that are 
currently promoted by the EU, as well as deeper military integration – the EU could provide the 
necessary military security for the very small state that Flanders would be. On the other hand, its 
position on other issues is ambivalent. For example, in spring 2011, N-VA first advocated for the 
possibility to unilaterally reinstate border controls in the Schengen zone, and a month later stated 
that the Community method should be followed in the reform of the Schengen zone and that the 
European Commission is the best placed actor to lead this process. Also its favourable attitude 
towards financial support for EU members in crisis, such as Greece, is somewhat strange in the light 
of its firm resistance against financial transfers within Belgium. VB is unequivocally opposed to 
financial transfers within the EU. 
 
There are a number of practical and legal obstacles for Flemish independence. Should Flanders 
become an independent state, the new country would have to re-negotiate accession to the EU, and 
its membership would be subject to approval by all the EU members. Other problematic issues 
include European citizenship, the currency, and the applicability of international treaties concluded 
by the EU. The Flemish nationalist parties have not yet communicated clear strategies for clarifying 
the uncertainties about the legal position of new states in the EU. 
A look ahead 
The next election period in 2014 (with regional, federal and European elections possibly on the same 
day or at least in the same period) has been dubbed ‘the mother of all elections’. For the N-VA, the 
final push to Flemish independence (even if it speaks about a more moderate post-independence 
state: confederation) is at stake. It hopes to profit from dissatisfaction with the current government 
led by a French-speaking socialist that has to carry out austerity policies. But the fact that the 
European elections coincide with the elections in Belgium might work against the N-VA. It could be 
forced to abandon its ‘constructive ambiguity’ on Europe: how does it see the transition for Flanders 
from a Belgian sub-state to an EU member state (if possible at all); what is its position on further 
European integration in financial, economic, budgetary (including fiscal capacity) and political 
dimensions as proposed in the Van Rompuy Report on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); in 
other words, how much sovereignty that it does not want to share at the Belgian level is it prepared 
to surrender to the European level? 
